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THE INTERNATIONAL REACH OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAW AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TIMBERLANE LUMBER CO. V.
BANK OF AMERICA
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress clearly has the power to regulate commerce
within its territorial boundaries and with foreign nations, pursuant to Arti-
cle I, Section 8 of the Constitution. However, implementation of the fra-
mers' policy decision to protect American markets and provide an open
economic atmosphere has created a myriad of problems and questions with
the overwhelming rise of multinational corporations internationally and
domestically. In early attempts to deal with anti-competitive forces, Con-
gress in 1890 enacted the Sherman Anti-trust Act.' In addition to its efforts
in 1890, Congress has periodically responded to international and domestic
antitrust needs. The Clayton Act of 1914,2 Federal Trade Commission Act
of 1918,1 and the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894,1 supplement the dominant
Sherman Act in regulating foreign commerce.5
However, what is the significance of U.S. legislation on international
markets? Are U.S. antitrust policies in agreement with foreign concepts of
competitive trade markets and the effects of trade restraints? What are the
potential adverse effects of applying U.S. antitrust law extraterritorily?
How far can U.S. courts reach? These and many other questions have
resulted from the growth of international markets. These questions have
one predominant issue, though, and that is jurisdiction. As far as jurisdic-
tion is concerned, the strongest position for application of U.S. antitrust
law is where a domestic corporation dealing internationally and affecting
U.S. commerce is attacked. However, at the opposite end of the spectrum
is a foreign corporation, operating totally extraterritorily, that has an ad-
verse effect on U.S. commerce. What supports U.S. intervention in that
1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1-7 (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 12-22 (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. § 41-45 (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 8-11 (1970).
5. The following excerpts from the Sherman Act have proven to be the most significant
tools for the judiciary in antitrust development.
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby aeclared to be illegal . . . . 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1970).
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1970).
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factual situation? In the transitional area, how does the U.S. gain jurisdic-
tion or enforcement over cartels? Can the U.S. prohibit an international
merger as it may within its territorial'limits?
Obviously, even a superficial analysis of the application of U.S. antitrust
law on international fronts presents the primary problem of scope involved
in such a multifarious undertaking. Therefore, it is the objective of this
analysis, through a primarily case study approach, to provide limited
background material on U.S. and foreign antitrust rationales, and focus on
the jurisdictional aspect of U.S. antitrust law with special emphasis on the
judiciary's approach in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T.
& S.A. 6 Secondarily, decisions on foreign acquisitions and mergers shall be
analyzed and, finally, recent trends and enforcement considerations shall
be scrutinized.
6. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
In Timberlane, there were four separate actions, including one brought under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, Sections One and Two, and three which were diversity tort actions. The district
court dismissed Timberlane's action under the act of state doctrine and for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The basic allegation in Timberlane was that officials of the Bank of
America and others located in the United States and Honduras conipired to prevent Timber-
lane, through its Honduras subsidiaries, from milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it
to the United States, thus maintaining control of the Honduran lumber export business in
the hands of a few select individuals financed and controlled by the Bank. The intent and
result of the conspiracy was to interfere with the exportation to the United States, including
Puerto Rico, of Honduran lumber for sale or use there by the plaintiffs, thus directly and
substantially affecting the foreign commerce of the United States.
The United States Court of Appeals decision to vacate dismissal and to remand for new
consideration was based on an expanded and fresh analysis of past and present international
antitrust principles. Basically, the court expanded the element to be considered [id. at 614]
and concluded that a balancing approach is to be applied. Succinctly, the court concluded
that foreign policy also is a primary concern and that the analysis should focus on whether
the contacts and interests of the United States are sufficient to support the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 614-15.
The court, examining the problems with extraterritorial application of U.S. law, further
expressed a three-prong test for determining jurisdiction.
We conclude, then, that the problem should be approached in three parts: Does the
alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United
States? Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the
Sherman Act? As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover if? The district court's
judgment found only that the restraint involved in the instant suit did not produce a
direct and substantial effect on American foreign commerce. That holding does not
satisfy any of these inquiries.
Id. at 615. Timberlane appears to be the modern trend in international application of U.S.
antitrust law.
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II. BACKGROUND
As legislative concern indicates, the United States has been most sensi-
tive to preserving a pervasive atmosphere of free economic competition.
Europe, however, has not displayed as intense a concern for preserving
broad competition. The primary difference in U.S. antitrust policy is its
prophylactic approach. U.S. legislation is framed to allow intervention into
the commercial market if there is even the possibility of an adverse effect
on commerce. In order to facilitate broad competition, Congress has pro-
vided the means to stop combinations and mergers before they occur, and
to discourage anti-competitive ventures.
Conversely, European antitrust laws are focused upon control of compa-
nies already in dominant market positions and not upon prevention of such
achievement. Paul Nixon differentiates the two positions succinctly.
Our [U.S.] policy rests on the twofold presumption, well supported by the
facts of industrial experience, as your recent hearings on economic concentra-
tion have shown, (1) that mergers of market leaders usually do not result in
social efficiencies, and (2) competition is a regulating force to be preserved
in its own right ....
In Europe, in contrast, antitrust policy is one of passive acquiescence in
merger, the theory being that once a firm reaches a dominant position in the
market it may then be subject to regulation. Some European antitrust offi-
cials take the position that mergers are imperative in order to achieve in-
creased efficiencies, and that competition may well be sacrificed on the alter
of such alleged gains in efficiency. But then they take a harsh view of domi-
nant firms.7
Since the underlying antitrust rationales are in conflict, the problem of
dealing with trade restraints internationally is compounded. There cannot
be a uniform approach and, consequently, the reach of U.S. law becomes
the primary question in protecting U.S. commerce from adverse effects
abroad. Besides the fundamental policy conflict and political differences
affecting international commerce, Congress elected to imminently inscribe
its legislative intent concerning antitrust reach and further complicate
evolution of uniform law procedure. Broad and vague statutory language
has precipitated dealing with international restraints of trade judicially on
a case by case basis, and, therefore, much is left to judicial discretion and
to prevailing attitudes.
7. Hearings on S. Res. 191 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 2nd Sess. 511, 516-17 (1966) (Statement of Paul
Rand Nixon).
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III. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
The Sherman Act provides broad jurisdiction over foreign commerce by
prohibiting acts that restrain interstate or foreign commerce., A host of
cases have interpreted and expounded on the general principle, delineating
rules and exceptions. While it was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.' that first dealt with antitrust impact on foreign commerce in a private
action,'" it was United States v. American Tobacco Co." that established
the posture for pervasive U.S. jurisdiction in foreign antitrust violations.
When the Supreme Court reversed a lower court finding and held that two
British companies, which were involved in trade restraint with American
Tobacco, were within the purview of the U.S. judiciary, American Banana
began to evolve into one of three basic modem defenses 2 to extraterritorial
jurisdiction and the long reach of U.S. antitrust regulations.
Following two intervening cases,'3 the judiciary, led by Judge Learned
Hand in 1945, made the most significant and imposing advancement in
antitrust policy. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),'4
the court opined that it had jurisdiction, regardless of U.S. territorial
contact, as long as the acts intentionally affected U.S. foreign commerce.
After Alcoa was found not to be a member of a group of foreign aluminum
producers attempting to dominate the international market, the court
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction, even though the parties were non-
nationals and the conduct was outside the territorial limits of the U.S. The
8. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1970).
9. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
10. American Banana was based on what later proved to be unpopular reasoning. In hold-
ing that jurisdiction was not established under the Sherman Act because the cause of action
in the complaint arose outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction (Panama and Costa Rica), the
court construed the Sherman Act as being confined to the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.
on the surface. Id.
11. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
12. Three major defenses to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law are: (1)
sovereign immunity, (2) the Act of State Doctrine, and (3) sovereign compulsion. See notes
47-57 infra and accompanying text.
13. In Thompson v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917), the court rejected.an American Banana
assertion of territoriality. The defendant attempted to apply the rationale to a conspiracy
entered into in a foreign country between U.S. and foreign corporations. The court held that
the conspiracy restrained foreign commerce and was made effective by acts in the U.S. See
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), which held Banana inapplicable even
though foreign legislation (Mexico and Yucatan) granted the trade restraint in the commodity
sisal because there was an "effect" on U.S. commerce here and the conspiracy precipitating
the trade restraint was entered into by parties in the U.S. and consummated by acts in the
U.S.
14. 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
[Vol. 13:149
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most significant aspect of Judge Hand's decision, which expanded jurisdic-
tion to conduct outside of the U.S. by non-nationals, was the two-prong
test which he enunciated. Judge Hand held there must have been an intent
to affect U.S. foreign commerce and an actual effect on commerce.'
Alcoa not only opened the door to expansion of U.S. antitrust law, but
also instigated inquiry and subsequent judicial diversity in defining
"effects" on commerce as another topic emerged for case law development.
A uniform definition of "effects" necessary to trigger antitrust jurisdiction
has not been asserted judicially. Will an indirect effect on commerce
suffice? J. Von Kalinowski offers an excellent analysis of the judicial usage
of "effects" and notes four particular categories. Opinions using "effects"
language have predominantly involved multinationals engaged in joint
ventures and the restraint has been framed to 1) simply affect, 2) directly
affect, 3) substantially affect, or 4) directly and substantially affect the
flow of commerce."
While case development has at best provided a choice of analyses to
follow, the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, has taken a strong
position on this matter.
15. Id. at 444.
16. J. VON KAuNowsKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 5.02[2] 5-124-5-129
(Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as VON KAuNowsi]. The following offers examples and case
analyses of the four types of "effects" language: (1) "simply affect" - Alcoa, which already
has been discussed, offers the best example of "affect" used without direction. Judge Hand
ruled the acts "were intended to affect imports and did affect them." Alcoa, note-14-supra,
at 444. (2) "directly affect" -United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. (ICI) Ltd., 100 F. Supp.
504 (S.D. N.Y. 1951). Here, the jurisdictional question focuses on reaching a Canadian sub-
sidiary (CXL) of ICI, a British company, and E.I. duPont Nemours formed to compete in
Canada. It was agreed the company would not compete with ICI and duPont by exporting
into the U.S. It was held this directly affected commerce and personal jurisdiction was gained
over ICI through its New York-based subsidiary. That decision was based on the reasoning
that the parent and subsidiary were so closely related that the decisions of the subsidiary
actually were directed by the parent. See M. Joelson and J. Griffin, Multinational Joint
Ventures and The U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 VA. J. INT. L. 487 (1925). (3) "substantially affect"
- United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957). Although jurisidiction
was sought only over U.S. nationals for a conspiracy in restraint of commerce in Japanese
wire nails and the situs of the conspiracy was in Japan, where the acts were legally condoned,
the court held that the substantial and direct effect of the conspiracy supports jurisdiction
regardless of the situs of the conspiracy. (4) "directly and substantially" - United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) focused on intent and held that the defen-
dant need not have specific intent to violate the antitrust law. Arguing that a lesser standard
of intent should apply to foreign corporations and that jurisdiction should not follow as long
as a direct and substantial effect was not resultant, the defendant lost because the intent to
enter the territorial restraint agreement alone was sufficient. The defendant, at least, should
have known the effect on commerce would be forthcoming. Id. at 890, 891. It is significant to
note that where "substantially" is used the effect always is direct even if such language is
not employed.
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Analysis of whether there is sufficient impact on U.S. Commerce to confer
jurisdiction generally involves the same practical analysis of purpose and
effect. . . .Accordingly, considerations of jurisdiction, enforcement policy,
and comity often, but not always, lead to the same conclusion: the U.S.
antitrust laws should be applied to an overseas transaction when there is a
substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce; and, con-
sistent with these ends, it should avoid unnecessary interference with the
sovereign interests of foreign nations. 7 (emphasis added).
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America"5 preceded this statement
of the Antitrust Department's apparent modem trend and offers excellent
analysis of the present considerations involved in the "effects" prong of
Alcoa. Essentially holding that an act of state9 is not an absolute bar to
U.S. antitrust actions and that such a defense should be strictly scruti-
nized by applying a conflicts of laws approach to analyze the jurisdictional
question," Timberlane contends:
The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider the other
nation's interests. Nor does it expressly take into account the full nature of
the relationship between the actors and this country. Whether the alleged
offender is an American citizen, for instance, may make a big difference:
applying American laws to American citizens raises fewer problems than
application to foreigners. 2'
The court went on to assert the actual regard for comity in many U.S.
antitrust decisions and the need for a more comprehensive examination of
the circumstances and underlying relationships in discerning the effect of
acts abroad on U.S. commerce.2 While Timberlane supports the strict
17. Statement of Justice Department, "Antitrust Guide for International Operations," 799
ATRR E-2, 3 (February 1, 1977).
18. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. The Act of State doctrine is a defense to establishment of jurisdiction in international
law cases. See notes 47-56 infra and accompanying text.
20. 549 F.2d at 613.
21. Id. at 611-12. For this same approach, see Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East
Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
22. American courts have, in fact, often displayed a regard for comity and the
prerogatives of other nations and considered their interests as well as other parts of
the factual circumstances, even when professing to apply the effects test. To some
degree, the requirement for a "substantial" effect may silently incorporate these addi-
tional considerations, with "substantial" as a flexible standard that varies other fac-
tors.
549 F.2d at 612.
An effect on United States commerce, although necessary to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion under the antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine
whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a matter of interna-
tional comity and fairness. In some cases, the application of the direct and substantial
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scrutiny and balancing test in determining jurisdiction, Alcoa arguably
intimates the same approach by inserting the intent criterion. In providing
the subjective element, the court at least has the capability to expand the
purview of its discretion.
Long before Timberlane, the judiciary as well as defendants focused on
the intent criterion of Alcoa to determine jurisdiction and to deal with
scope restraints often inherent in international matters.Y Although the
second element of the two-prong jurisdictional test opens the door to
broadening judicial discretion in applying U.S. antitrust law extraterrito-
rially,U the development of the "intent" element of Alcoa has not been
interpreted, or applied to perform that function. This development is best
exemplified by the multinational cases involving joint ventures, acquisi-
tions and cartel arrangements.
United States v. General Electric Co.2s is an excellent example of the
defendant's versus the court's emphasis on intent. The court applied a
unique expanded reasonableness standard in holding the defendant foreign
company responsible for intent to affect U.S. commerce because it should
have known, if it didn't know, the eventual consequences of its agreement
with General Electric. 26
In leading cases involving multinational business ventures, United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.21 and United States v. Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Co.,2 the judiciary focused on the parties'
broad intent to restrain foreign trade by entering joint ventures and licens-
ing agreements. Both defendants attempted to shield themselves behind
test in the international context might open the door too widely by sanctioning juris-
diction over an action when these considerations would indicate dismissal. At other
times, it may fail in the other direction, dismissing a case for which comity and fairness
do not require forebearance, thus closing the jurisdictional door too tightly-for the
Sherman Act does reach some restraints which do not have both a direct and substan-
tial effect on the foreign commerce of the United States. A more comprehensive inquiry
is necessary. We believe that the field of conflict of laws presents the proper approach
549 F.2d at 613.
23. The Tate letter offers an example of this jurisdiction dilemma on international affairs.
What part does the executive branch play? Letter from Jack B. Tate (Acting Legal Advisor
of State Dept.) to Attorney General Philip B. Pearleman (May 19, 1952, reprinted in 26 Dept.
of St. Bull. 984 (1950).
24. "The intent requirement suggested by Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443, is one example of an
attempt to broaden the courts' perspective, as is drawing a distinction between American
citizens and non-citizens." 549 F.2d at 612.
25. See note 16 supra.
26. See 82 F. Supp. at 884, 891.
27. 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), affl'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
28. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
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joint venture arguments and asserted such agreements were necessary to
combat market conditions and operate profitably. The basic philosophy on
such joint ventures by multinationals was asserted in Timken:
If a joint venture or partnership is formed for the purpose of a lawful business
enterprise and restraints result from the right to protect established business
interests no violation of law occurs. But if the association is formed for the
purpose of continuing a combination to allocate exclusive sales territories in
the world, to fix prices and to eliminate competition both within and without
the combination, it cannot hide from the effects of the law under the cloak
of a joint venture or partnership."
The essence of Timken and Minnesota leave multinationals in a preca-
rious situation. When combined with General Electric and the two-prong
test of Alcoa, joint ventures by multinationals apparently are under strict
scrutiny by the judiciary. While the facts of Timken and Minnesota sup-
port the obvious conclusion of significant effects on commerce (agreements
among corporations in each case constituted 70 to 80 percent of the respec-
tive product markets), it can be argued the holdings reflect the attitude
that joint ventures and acquisitions abroad by multinationals per se affect
foreign commerce.
It is obvious, then, that most acts can easily be linked to foreign com-
merce, and once that hurdle is cleared it is a small step to infer conspira-
torial intent from those acts. This is the position asserted by the Southern
District of New York in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd."
In a private suit whereby United States distributors of imported Scotch
whiskey brought an action against British distillers claiming the distillers
unlawfully required inclusion of unreasonably short terms and notice of
termination provisions in their distributorship agreements, the court held
plaintiffs adequately alleged "intent" to restrain." District Judge Robert
L. Carter opined:
The intent requirement. . . is a general intent to affect commerce, 'and may
be satisfied by the rule that a person is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his actions.' . . . Defendants' intent to affect United States
commerce is inferrable from the assignment of exclusive distributorship
rights in the United States.3
Since the intent requirement essentially has evolved to present no real
jurisdictional problem, a stricter scrutiny of the substantial effects test
29. See note 27 supra, at 312.
30. 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
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should be utilized to insure a comprehensive and balanced test for discern-
ing legislative jurisdiction. The balancing approach provides a much better
framework in dealing with the primary jurisdictional defenses to antitrust
actions as well.
IV. ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
Before analyzing the major defenses, however, adjudicatory jurisdiction
must be considered. Even if legislative jurisdiction is established, adjudi-
catory jurisdiction must be within the reach of the U.S. judiciary. How-
ever, this has not proven too burdensome to the judiciary since the interna-
tional capital market is strongly linked to the United States and most
foreign multinationals are dependent on U.S. financial sources or are con-
nected via subsidiary structures.
Since there is little or no problem in gaining adjudicatory jurisdiction
over domestic corporations," this section shall analyze the case law dealing
with alien corporations." Service of process is the first requisite for estab-
lishing adjudicatory jurisdiction. In order to gain jurisdiction over an alien
corporation, two landmark procedure cases hold that the corporation must
have certain minimum contacts" with the forum, and that those contacts
must be of such a nature that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
fundamental notions of fair play and substantial justice."8
The most significant decision relating to jurisdiction over an alien corpo-
ration in an antitrust case came in 1948. In viewing the "doing business"
test and in construing the jurisdictional statute37 involved to meet mini-
mum contacts, United States v. Scophony Corp." held that the Court
would look at all circumstances and the entire business operation to meet
the "transacting business" and "found" requirements in order to gain the
requisite service of process for in personam jurisdiction." For achieving
service of process, Justice Frankfurter noted in Scophony, "a corporation
33. Domestic corporations generally are amenable to personal service of process due to
numerous business contacts and agents.
34. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrRusT LAWS, § 3.1-3.20 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited FUGATE].
35. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
36. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
37. The statutory basis for the claim was § 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22. It
provides: "Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served
in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found."
38. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
39. Id. See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Material Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927),
held "found" requires something more than transacting business.
1978]
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can be 'found' anywhere, whenever the needs of the law make it appropri-
ate to attribute location to a corporation provided that the activities on its
behalf that are more than episodic are carried on by its agents in a particu-
lar place.""0
Since Scophony, it clearly has been the judiciary's policy to liberally
grant jurisdiction on a host of contacts including agency relationships in
the United States,4 ' subsidiary," land-parent relationships, 3 and property
located in the U.S.14 However, actual service and appearance of the alien
corporation are essential in obtaining adjudicatory jurisdiction. 5 The pres-
ent policy of the Antitrust Division is clearly expansive." This is indicative
of the greater weight placed on the "effects" test and obtaining legislative
jurisdiction as foreign relations and enforcement policy are more closely
scrutinized.
40. Id. at 819.
41. Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert denied, 389 U.S.
923 (1967). Frummer involved a claim by a U.S. citizen injured while vacationing at a Hilton
Hotel in London. The plaintiff filed suit in New York against United Kingdom Hilton, a
British corporation, and Hilton International, a Delaware corporation which owned all but
one share of United Kingdom. The court held 4-3 that the British corporation was present in
New York. The court further noted that the fact Hilton Reservation Service and U.K. Hilton
are owned in common by Hilton International and Hilton Hotels Corporation gives rise to a
valid inference as to the broad scope of the agency in the absence of an express agency
relationship. Id. at 45.
42. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y. 1951),
holds the control of U.S. subsidiaries by alien corporations provides sufficient "contacts."
43. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp.
40 (S.D. N.Y. 1955). This is another important case in that it established jurisdiction by
piercing the corporate veil. It was held that where a New York corporation, which was jointly
owned by two Swiss corporations, conducted a watch repair service to advance their business
and the New York corporation had no independent business of its own, the Swiss corporations
were present in this country for purposes of service of process.
44. The seizure method of gaining jurisdiction in rem is a potential threat to foreign
corporations, but the statutory provisions are rarely invoked. See FUGATE at 108-11.
45. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltime Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), held that a
subsidiary's stipulation that it is the same entity as its parent was insufficient to support
personal jurisdiction over the foreign parent, absent service on such parent and appearance
in court by that parent.
46. Second, there is the question of personal jurisdiction over those who would be
charged with a violation of our law. The general trend of modem history has been to
expand the personal jurisdiction of our courts to reach those who transact business in
a certain place, even if they are not "found" there in a traditional juiisdictional sense.
The Department will utilize these principles to seek to exercise the fullest permissible
jurisdiction over those who illegally cartelize our markets.
Dept. of Justice, "Antitrust Guide for International Operations" (January 26, 1977), 799
ATRR E-3 (1977).
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V. DEFENSES
There are three basic defenses to the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
parties. They include the act of state doctrine, sovereign compulsion and
sovereign immunity. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino47 sets forth the
act of state doctrine, but Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba," reaffirmed the precept in traditional terms." The court in Dunhill
succinctly stated the underlying policy of the doctrine in conjunction with
a glimpse of the movement toward Timberlane.
The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclos-
ing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their
own soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in
the conduct of our foreign relations . . . .But based on the presently ex-
pressed views of those who conduct our relations with foreign countries, we
are in no sense compelled to recognize as an act of state the purely commer-
cial conduct of foreign governments in order to avoid embarrassing conflicts
with the Executive Branch."
Available whether the defendant is acting for the sovereign or is a sover-
eign, the act of state doctrine is closely related to the sovereign compulsion
defense. While the "act of state" must be the only act and the restraint
must have been the sovereign's act, or compelled by the sovereign, the
sovereign compulsion defense is more substantive and focuses on whether
the defendants were "totally" compelled to perform the acts constituting
a restraint of trade because of the foreign sovereign.51 Interamerican Refin-
ing Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc." provides a recent example of the
sovereign compulsion defense. The defendants succeeded in asserting the
foreign sovereign forced compliance with a boycott of a domestic refinery
through threats of expropriation.13 However, Tim berlane again provides an
excellent example of the modem trend in this area where the court stated:
"[W]e do not necessarily endorse the strict view that American courts can
never review action compelled by a foreign government." 5
47. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
48. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
49. The court in Dunhill reaffirmed its past position. "[The Act of State doctrine]'precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a
recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory' . . . and, that it
applies to 'acts done within their own States, in the exercise of governmental authority.'
(citations omitted)." Id. at 706. Hence, expropriation of an alien's property within the bound-
aries of a sovereign state is traditionally considered to be a public act of the sovereign outside
the reach of the U.S. judiciary.
50. 425 U.S. at 697-98.
51. See VON KAL!NOWSKI, Special Analysis, Antitrust Report (Sept. 1977).
52. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
53. Id.
54. 549 F.2d at 607 n.10.
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Sovereign immunity is the long-standing rule that the sovereign is abso-
lutely immune from suit.5 5 While sovereign immunity issues at one time
were as much within executive purview as the judiciary's scope,56 the Con-
gress has clearly changed its former liberal approach in favor of the sover-
eign to a much more restrictive policy. The Sovereign Immunities Act of
197657 is indicative of this shift. The most significant aspect of the Act
segregates commercial activity from governmental activity and allows ju-
risdiction to stand for the former.5 Neither does the Sovereign Immunities
Act interfere with the act of state doctrine. The legislation was not de-
signed to address the act of state defense. 5
The act of state doctrine accordingly remains a viable defense on its face.
However, analysis of a government statement in an arnicus brief in
Dunhill" reveals that the defense's significance in accordance with the
Sabbatino approach may be waning.
The committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine
in this legislation since decisions such as that in the Dunhill case demon-
strate that our courts already have considerable guidance enabling them to
reject improper assertions of the act of state doctrine. For example, it appears
that the doctrine would not apply to the cases covered by H.R. 11315, whose
touchstone is a concept of'commercial activity' involving significantjurisdic-
tional contacts with this country. The conclusions of the committee are in
55. Continental Ore Co., v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
56. See note 23 supra.
57. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Congress declares its purpo.;e as follows:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of
foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests
of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United
States courts. Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commer-
cial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against
them in connection with their commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to im-
munity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States
in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.
58. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implica-
tion, ...
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States . ...
59. See note 51 supra.
60. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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concurrence with the position of the government in its amicus brief to the
Supreme Court in the Dunhill case where the Solicitor General stated:
[Ulnder the modem restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a for-
eign state is not immune from suit on its commercial obligations. To
elevate the foreign state's commercial acts to the protected status of"acts of state" would frustrate this modem development by permitting
sovereign immunity to re-enter through the back door, under the guise
of the act of state doctrine.6'
Dunhill supports the proposition that sovereign immunity does not provide
a defense for a sovereign acting in its proprietary capacity. 2 The Court
refused to extend the act of state defense to a sovereign that has descended
to the level of an entrepreneur. 3 Coupled with Timberlane, which em-
ployed a conflicts approach in determining that the act of state doctrine
did not provide shelter from antitrust action, it appears that antitrust
defenses have been substantially weakened. However, Timberlane may be
interpreted as merely returning some consideration and power to the State
Department and executive branch in consideration of foreign relations.
VI. ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, JOINT VENTURES
The foregoing analysis indicates the pervasive state of flux that has
plagued international antitrust authorities from the inception of the pro-
tective legislation. A brief examination of the application of antitrust law
to acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures should explain some of the
underlying reasons for this skewed development and should clarify the
present state of the law. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950
by the Celler-Kefauver Act," is the most important legislation in this
area. 5 The other statutes also are relevant, though, and must be consid-
ered as well in attacking mergers, joint ventures or acquisitions.66
61. VoN KAUNOWSFu, supra n. 423, at 5-145.
62. "We decline to extend the Act of State doctrine to acts committed by foreign sovereigns
in the course of their purely commercial operations." 425 U.S. at 706.
63. "Because the act relied on by respondents in this case was an act arising out of the
conduct by Cuba's agents in the operation of cigar business for profit, the act was not an act
of state." Id.
64. The Celler-Kefauver provision substantially improved the effectiveness of the Clayton
Act by expanding its application to cover "asset acquisitions" as well as the normal course
of acquisition through stock trading. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1970).
65. The Clayton Act as amended is designed to prevent the adverse effects of anti-
competitive acquisitions before the corporations' actions have had the opportunity to affect
trade. The Act is broad in nature and applicable to all acquisitions and mergers in which there
is the probability of adverse effects on competition. For analysis of this philosophy in merger
cases, see FUGATE § 10.12.
66. The Sherman Act's significance is highlighted when compared to the Clayton Act. The
Sherman Act does not require the parties to the suit to be "engaged in commerce" as Clayton
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United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,67 which comments on the
potential effects of mergers,"8 essentially eliminated the technical distinc-
tions between mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures for the purpose of
establishing'jurisdiction.69 By far, this 1964 decision has had the most
significant impact on recent antitrust law relating to merger activity.
Penn-Olin holds that Section 7 applies to joint ventures and, in effect,
classifies such activity as an acquisition by the two venturers. Thus, this
reasoning disposes of the technical argument that the "new" entity was not
engaged in commerce for purposes of Section 7.70 The Supreme Court em-
phasized the corporate strength of both parties and the ability to compete
individually in concluding that potential competition was sufficient to
invoke Section 7.11
In addition, the Court asserted that mergers and joint ventures are not
governed by the same criteria, but held that "[o]verall, the same consid-
erations apply to joint ventures as to mergers .. ". ."I' Although there
appears to be a conflict in fundamental reasoning, especially when consid-
ered in relation to the Court's differentiation of the two methods of corpo-
rate expansion,73 the opinion simply exemplifies the Court's overall atti-
tude in this area and clarifies reasons for prevailing confusion in interna-
tional antitrust. The Court simply refuses to tightly close any doors.
It is apparent the judiciary's reach has expanded substantially to touch
any and all corporate activity on the international field. United States v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co." represents this impact with regard to foreign
and has a broad jurisdictional base as previously noted. The Sherman Act however, also has
a stricter standard with respect to "substantial effects." Clayton only has to show the poten-
tial effect.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act expands the reach of U.S. antitrust law
even farther than Clayton. This act does not require either the acquiring entity or the ac-
quired company to be "engaged in commerce." This section is much stronger than Sherman
in that, like Clayton, it is aimed at arresting restraints on their incipiency. The FTC provision
could be used where both Sherman and Clayton Tests are not met. The F'" act also applies
to "persons" where Clayton is only addressed to "corporations." See generally E. KINTrNER,
AN ANTITRUST PmMER (1973).
67. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
68. FUGATE § 10.11 at 342.
69. See Joelson and Griffin, note 17 supra, at 498.
70. Id.
71. See note 61 supra.
72. 378 U.S. at 170.
73. The Court said: "The merger eliminates one of the participating corp orations from the
market while a joint venture creates a new competitive force therein." Id. Arguably, absent
any agreement restraining trade, the joint venture supports fundamental United States anti-
trust policy.
74. 253 F. Supp. 129 (N. Cal. 1966), aff'd., 385 U.S. 37 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S.
1021 (1967).
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acquisitions by United States corporations.75 Unlike previous cases, there
was no relationship to other anti-competitive activity.', Still, the potential
effect triggered judicial scrutiny. The court applied Section 7 of Clayton
in Schlitz, but there are numerous routes to pursue in attacking a corpo-
rate acquisition or merger. The jurisdictional language of the statutes dif-
fer significantly, but, when construed collectively with case law, there is
no reprieve from strict judicial supervision for the multinational.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the myriad of approaches and inherent confusion of broad statu-
tory language, the United States historically has insisted on its power to
apply antitrust law internationally. However, does not imberlane's ex-
tension of the "substantial effects" test and emphasis on international
considerations create inherent conflict in international policy? Do not
broad statutory and case law provisions act deferentially by failing to
establish consistent standards? The foregoing analysis and implications of
Timberlane as well as recent Justice Department Antitrust Guidelines77
provide dispositive evidence of modern antitrust trends. While enforce-
ment always has been a consideration of United States antitrust policy-
makers, it appears to be receiving much more attention.
Basically, United States enforcement policy is aimed at two fundamen-
tal purposes. The protection of a competitive market to benefit American
consumers is the overriding goal. Secondly, antitrust law is designed to
protect broad economic opportunities for business in deference to private,
highly concentrated economic domination.78 The essential problem of this
underlying enforcement policy is conflicts of interests on an international
scale. The potential ramifications of the United States antitrust rationales
are endless. Every facet of international relations is bound to be affected
given the extent of today's economic interdependency. Is a possible side
effect of this approach the alienation of foreign governments as businesses
75. The objective of Schlitz was to prevent the United States corporation from gaining
constructive control of a United States based subsidiary. The company acquired by Schlitz
owned controlling interest in a California brewery. Besides the direct competition between
the two United States companies, the potential competition between the acquiring company
and the acquired was emphasized in analyzing the impact on United States markets. See
generally FUGATE § 10.11, 10.12.
76. United States v. National Lead, 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), mod. & aff'd., 332
U.S. 319 (1947), and United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 506
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), are exemplary of most early antitrust cases in that such actions were pre-
dominantly aimed at broad based monopolistic patterns and conspiracies.
77. Department of Justice, "Antitrust Guide for International Operations" (January 26,
1977), 799 ATRR E-1 (1977).
78. Id. at E-2.
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take sides internationally for economic gains? Can multinationals alienate
governments and essentially avoid controls by pitting one government
against another? An additional complication is the fact that United States
antitrust policy is fundamentally different from that of the European com-
munity." Does not Timberlane's approach, which balances the effects of
extensive reach, foreign relations and enforcement problems, provide a
better avenue of pursuit for all concerned?
Richard D. Allred
79. See notes 6, 7 supra.
